NEW JERSEY'S EXPANDING SCOPE
OF TORT LIABILITY AND
RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
Negligence principles have long provided redress for improper
invasions of interests in personal property and bodily security. Yet
curiously little relief has been afforded that injury which may be the
most substantial: the emotional pain and suffering attendant the
death of a loved one.' Indeed, common law denied all rights to any
damages arising from the death of a human being. 2 In New Jersey

New Jersey provides two distinct statutory remedies for a wrongfully inflicted death.
Under the "survival act" the executor or administrator may be compensated for damages
sustained by the decedent prior to death, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West Cum. Supp.
1980-1981), while under the "wrongful death act" the executor or administrator may be compensated for the pecuniary losses experienced by the decedent's survivors. Id. § 2A:31-1 to 6.
Thus, each statute protects a separate interest. The "survival act" protects the interest of the
decedent himself; the "death act" protects the interest of the family and dependents. See. e.g..
Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
2 The regularly cited authority for the rule that there could be no recovery for a negligently
inflicted death is Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808), in which it was declared: "In
a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." Despite that
this was a decision at nisi prius, supported by no authority, and sustained by no reasoning, the
proposition was basically accepted as a proper statement of the common law. Holdsworth, The
Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAW Q. Rsv. 431, 431 (1916). See, e.g.. Grosso v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317, 13 A. 233 (1888).
Commentators have generally agreed that the holding in Baker v. Bolton was the product of
confusion concerning the application of two primitive common law principles: (1) actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person, and (2) the felony merger
doctrine-a civil wrong merges into a felony. See Holdsworth. svpra; Smedley, WrongJul
Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960). But see Winfield,
Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLJM. L. REv. 239 (1929). Considering their import,
the origins of the principles and the reasons for their existence are surprisingly obscure, but the
early English concept that damages served a punitive rather than compensatory purpose was
probably their source. See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF Toms 61 (7th ed. 1904).
Because the legal successor represented not the person of the decedent, but only the worldly
goods, he had no right to obtain the retribution served by punishment. The aim of punishment
being eliminated, the decedent's right was prevented from surviving. See Malone, The Genesis of
Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043 (1965). See also Winfield, supra. Whereas this would
account for the prohibition on survival actions, it would not bar claims brought on behalf of
survivors who were injured by the death. In this instance, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
would be dead, so the principle would not apply.
The action arising in someone other than the decedent was effectively prohibited-by .the
felony merger doctrine pronounced in the case of Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B.
1607). See Malone, supra, at 1056-59. Under this principle any wrong that amounted to a felony
was punished exclusively by the Crown. Because most homicides were considered felonies, a civil
cause of action was virtually eliminated. See Holdsworth, supra, at 432-33; Smedley, supra. at
611-13. Furthermore, in these cases the defendant usually was executed and his property
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this injustice was ameliorated in 1848 by the passage of a statute 3
which compensated certain beneficiaries of the deceased for the pecuniary losses sustained in the event of a wrongful death.4 Since then
damages have been calculated on virtually the same basis. 5 Consequently, under the New Jersey wrongful death statute emotional injuries will not be compensated. 6

confiscated, so there was nothing on which to base a civil action for damages. W. PRossER,
IIANDOOK OF THE LAW OF Toirs § 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971). Vengeance could reach no further
than the grave. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 345 (1937).
This era ended in England in 1846 with the adoption of Lord Campbell's Act which created
a right of action for certain dependents of the deceased. Act for Compensating the Families of
Persons Killed by Accidents, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93. This act was the prototype for the New
Jersey statute that soon followed. Alfonev. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 104, 432 A.2d 857, 860 (1981). See
generally S. SPEisER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.9, at 29 (2d ed. 1975). Even after the
common law rule had been statutorily abrogated, courts often offered justifications for its
existence. The most popular seemed to be the proposition that it is immoral to award damages
for the loss of life: "[Tihere is a natural and universal repugnance among enlightened nations to
setting a price on human life." Grosso, 50 N.J.L. at 320, 13 A. at 235. See generally Smedley,
supra, at 617. Another reason was based on the assertion that it is impossible to calculate the
value of human life. Van Beeck, 300 U.S. at 344-45. One scholar understands this reasoning to
mean "because the compensation cannot be adequate there shall be no compensation at all." F.
POLLOCK, .supra,at 64. A last rationalization concerned itself with the problem of prescribing a
limit to the scope of liability. See Smedley, supra, at 618-19.
Act of March 3, 1848, Pub. L. No. 1848, at 151.
The statute provided in part:
[S]uch action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin .. .
and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and
just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the wife and
next kin of such deceased person ....
Id.
This statute, though substantially similar to Lord Campbell's Act, see discussion in note 2
supra, differs in one important respect from its English predecessor. It fixes the measure of
damages to pecuniary injuries suffered by the survivors. The English provision for damages was
not so limited, but was subsequently restricted in the same way by judicial interpretation in the
case of Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852). See Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303,
307-08, 204 A.2d 140, 143 (1964). See generally Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy:
DamagesforMental Anguish of Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REv.
1, 6-8 (1976).
5 Compare Tefler v. Northern R.R., 30 N.J.L. 188 (1862) with Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1,
424 A.2d 210 (1980). The statement in the text remains true despite legislative amendments of
the statutes on various occasions. See Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
8 The principal provision of the present wrongful death act that this comment will be
concerned with can be found at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), and
is entitled "Assessment of damages by jury." It reads: "In every action brought under the
provisions of this chapter the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with
reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons entitled to any
intestate personal property of the decedent." id.
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Measuring a death's net economic impact on survivors 7 presents a
special problem when the deceased is a child.8 In this instance, the
standards that normally delineate pecuniary losses do not exist. 9 Furthermore, the cost of raising a child will almost always exceed any
expected pecuniary benefits, so damages strictly computed should
usually produce no recovery.' 0 The lamentable result of this approach to human life is that when the damage calculation is carried to
its correct conclusion, the life of a child can be considered less valuable than an automobile."

The persons entitled to claim under the statute are defined in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-2
(West 1952):
Every action commenced under this chapter shall be brought in the name of an
administrator ad prosequendum of the decedent for whose death damages are
sought, except where decedent dies testate and his will is probated, in which event
the executor named in the will and qualifying, or the administrator with the will
annexed, as the case may be, shall bring the action.
id.
s Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 6, 424 A.2d 210, 212 (1980). Damages are calculated by
estimating the child's probable pecuniary contributions had he or she lived, but from this
amount the probable future costs of maintaining the child must be deducted. Id.
9 See S. SPmsER, supra note 2,§ 4:22.
To determine the extent of the pecuniary loss, among other things, the following factors
may be considered: the life expectancy as well as the age and health of the deceased and
survivors; the deceased's actual earnings at the time of death and the potential for future
earnings; any other financial contributions the deceased would have made; and, the value of any
assistance or services the decedent would have provided. MoDE. JURv CHARCES-CIvIL § 6.15 (2d
ed. 1978). Additionally, when the entitled survivor is a dependent minor the reasonable value of
any training or guidance the decedent would have rendered may be considered. See notes 32-37
infra and accompanying text.
By necessity, the evaluation of damages when the deceased is a child usually concentrates on
the value of probable services the deceased would have performed had his or her life continued.
See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 7, 424 A.2d 210, 212 (1980). For example, the typical trial
scenario may include the presentation of such evidence as house-cleaning, cooking, washing, and
gardening. See note 29 infra. Special circumstances may sometimes furnish more convincing
proof of future pecuniary contributions from children; see, e.g., Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach
Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357 (App. Div. 1963) (exceptionally high IQ and
probable earning capacity of fifteen-year-old decedent considered while assessing excessiveness of
jury verdict); however, this is the exception rather than the rule. Normally little proof will exist
which is capable of making more or less probable any estimation of future pecuniary contributions. This is especially true in cases of young children, where according to Dean McCormick
"the web of speculation" is stretched rather far. C. McCowincx, DAMAGES 354 (1935). See 85
N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
'0 See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 18-19, 424 A.2d 210, 219 (1980), wherein the court
described this phenomenon by stating that a "conscientious jury will add up the numbers and
come in with zero."
11 See Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 241-42, 76 N.W.2d 80, 89 (1956) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
When full compensation is allowed for the value of an automobile, but the law must strain
to recompense a grieving mother for the loss of her son, there lies the sordid implication that the
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That this callous concept exists in the law is an affront to the
administration of justice. 2 Damages that redress only economic consequences fail to account for "the most substantial" injury caused by a
child's death.' 3 The loss of life is not rendered insignificant because
the deceased was not supporting others.' 4 For this reason, the New
Jersey wrongful death statute should be amended to include the assessment of the emotional injuries accompanying death.' 5 Recently,
without abandoning adherence to the pecuniary rule, two Supreme
Court of New Jersey decisions have resourcefully circumvented its
harsh consequences by providing new relief for negligent invasions of
the familial relationship. 6 In Green v. Bittner,17 the court expanded
the scope of permissible damages in wrongful death actions brought
by a parent; and in Portee v. Jaffee, is a personal injury case, the court
extended tort liability to hold that a mother who witnessed the death
of her child could receive damages for her resultant emotional injuries.'9

latter injury is less onerous. This arises because the law evaluates a lost life like an interest in
personal property. Of course, no compensation wrill genuinely replace the mother's child, but it
is illogical to deny damages on the grounds they are inadequate. See F. POLLACK, supra note 2, at
64. Neither do damages restore a lost leg. See Speiser & Malawer, supra note 4, at 19.
12While describing the "tense effort" required to justify damages under a pecuniary standard one commentator has facetiously suggested that a defendant could present a counter-claim
"for wrongfully relieving the plaintiff of a financial liability." Hare, The Rationale of Damages
for the Death of a Minor or Other Dependent Person, 41 B.U. L. REv. 336, 338 (1961).
11In Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 5, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980), the court described the
emotional suffering sustained by parents at the death of their child as "unquestionably the most
substantial element of damages in these cases, but legally impermissible."
14Although the defect in the pecuniary standard is most poignantly evident in the childdeath context, a similar predicament is presented by other circumstances in which the deceased
is not a wage earner; for example, disabled persons or retirees.
Is See Speiser & Malawer, supra note 4.
Calculating emotional injuries as a component of damages would not be a novel extension
of the law in this jurisdiction. "Courts have come to recognize that mental and emotional distress
is just as 'real' as physical pain, and.. . its valuation is no more difficult." Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979). See notes 114-23 infra and accompanying text.
18 The pecuniary standard is also averruncated by courts that sustain substantial damage
awards for the deaths of children. See, e.g., Clifford v. McCloskey, 13 N.J. Super. 96, 80 A.2d
134 (Law Div. 1951). Regarding this practice of judicial benevolence, Dean Prosser has concluded that the standard "is wrong, and not the result." W. Nossma, supra note 2, § 127, at 909.
17 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
Is 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
19As indicated in the text, the holding in Portee concerns a mother's individual cause of
action. Its relevance to the wrongful death statute will be detailed below, especially at note 98
infra.
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GREEN v. BITTNER

After seventeen year old 20 Donna Green died from injuries sustained in an automobile accident, her father brought suit under the
New Jersey wrongful death statute. 21 In a bifurcated trial the plaintiff prevailed on the issue of liability; 22 however, on the issue of
damages a jury returned a verdict for no damages.2 3 Plaintiff then
moved for a new trial.24 The motion was denied, and that decision
was affirmed by the appellate division,2 - but subsequently reversed by
the supreme court.2 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Robert Wilentz
specifically addressed the lack of a damage award, observing that
"[i]n effect her life was adjudicated worthless to others," 2 7 and "[t]o
sustain such a verdict 'would result in a return to the outmoded
doctrine that a child is a liability-not an asset.' ",28 The court expanded the recovery available to parents in a wrongful death case by
holding that damages are not to be limited to "the well-known elements of pecuniary loss, ' 29 but should also include compensation for
the pecuniary value of the companionship lost as a result of the
death. 30 While setting aside the verdict and remanding for a new
trial, the court virtually commanded there be a damage award for the
3
wrongful death of a child. 1
To support its conclusion, the court compared the damages
awarded to children for the wrongful death of an adult with the

20 Petition for Certification on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
21 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 to 6 (West Gum. Supp. 1980-1981). See note I supra.
22 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
3 Id.
24 Id. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212.
3 Id.
26 Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
27 Id.

" Id. (quoting Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 409, 93 A.2d 190, 195
(App. Div. 1952)).
29 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211. The court found the well-known elements to include "the
value of the child's anticipated help with household chores, or. . . anticipated direct financial
contribution by the child after he or she becomes a wage earner." Id. It noted that a parent's
pecuniary loss could include lost financial contributions from a child after his or her majority,
McStay v. Pryzchocki, 7 N.J. 456, 81 A.2d 761 (1951), but normally pecuniary loss is limited to
the value of household chores. 85 N.J. at 8, 424 A.2d at 212.
30 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
31 Id. The language of the opinion reads: "Given this expansion of permissible recovery, a
verdict finding no damages for the death of a child should ordinarily be set aside by the trial
court and a new trial ordered." Id.
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damages that have been awarded to adults for the wrongful death of a
child.3 2 It found that in the first instance damages were awarded to
surviving children for lost guidance and counsel that might have been
received, 33 while in the child death cases such damages were never
before expressly recognized by a New Jersey court.3 4 The court scrutinized the trial judge's jury charge and concluded that the instruction
lacked any reference to damages which might arise from the parents'
future loss of assistance or guidance. 5 Instead, the charge focused on
the lost value of household services that the deceased might have
rendered.3 6 From this amount the jury was instructed to deduct the
37
parents' probable future costs to support the deceased.
The supreme court found no justification for the inconsistent
remedies that had developed in wrongful death cases. 38 Under New
Jersey case law surviving children have been allowed damages for lost
guidance and counsel, despite difficulties in proof and regardless of
any legal duty on the adult to provide such services. 3 9 Additionally,

3, Id. at 7-9, 424 A.2d at 212-13.

Id. at 8, 424 A.2d at 213.
I'
Id. at 9, 424 A.2d at 213.
In noting the case of Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 567, 44 A. 633, 636 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1899), Chief Justice Wilentz observed language contrary to the proposition stated in
..Id.
the text: -[T]he jury cannot take into consideration mental suffering or loss of society ....
85 N.J. at 18, 424 A.2d at 218-19. The court differentiated Cooper, and its legion, on the basis
that no attempts were ever made to isolate the emotional aspects of companionship and society
from their pecuniary elements. In this regard, neither Cooper nor the cases which follow it were
3I

overruled. Id.
3s 85 N.J. at 8, 424 A.2d at 213. The court explained:

There was no reference, for instance to the pecuniary value of companionship and
advice that Donna might perhaps have given her parents as she and they grew older,
the caretaking role that she might have fulfilled towards them over time, whether in
the sense of actual physical care and companionship in the event of illness or old age,
or services and chores performed simply out of a continuing sense of family obligation.

Id.
Id. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212.
Id. The court pointed out that this charge conformed to existing law, and that the trial
I'
judge had been correct in ruling on the motion for new trial. That ruling was based on the
deduction that "it would be reasonable for this jury to come to [the] conclusion that the value of
her services to babysit or to dry dishes was far exceeded by the cost to the family of feeding,
clothing, and educating her." Id. at 6-7, 424 A.2d at 212.
Id. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215.
Id. at 8, 424 A.2d at 213. The court referred to various New Jersey cases: Suarez v. Berg,
117 N.J. Super. 456, 285 A.2d 68 (App. Div. 1971), wherein'it was stated that damages to minor
children may include the economic value of the lost guidance, care, and advice of a parent;
Carter v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 76 N.J.L. 602, 71 A. 253 (1908), which held that
children may recover the pecuniary value of the loss of the deceased's services; and Clark v.
Prime, 18 N.J. Misc. 226, 12 A.2d 635 (Cir. Ct. 1940), which recognized the pecuniary value of
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these cases have not indicated that the child's damages are limited to
the period preceding the attainment of majority. 40 Noting that the
wrongful death statute plainly applies only one standard for damages,
the court concluded that each case should be treated similarly. 4 I
Therefore, in a wrongful death action brought by parents for the
death of their child,4 2 besides the commonly accepted elements of
damages, the jury must consider the pecuniary value of the parents'
loss of guidance, advice, and companionship. 43
True to the statutory command, the court limited the damages
for companionship and advice to a pecuniary component. 4 The
child's services have a pecuniary value to aging parents in the same
way that guidance and counsel by parents have a pecuniary value to

a mother's nurture and moral, physical, and intellectual training as compensable. 85 N.J. at 8.
424 A.2d at 213.
The best rationale sustaining the award for these damages under a pecuniary standard is
found in the case of Tilley v. Hudson River R.R., 29 N.Y. 252 (1864):
It is certainly possible, and not only so but highly probable, that a mother's
nurture, instruction, and training, if judiciously administered will operate favorably
upon the worldly prospects and pecuniary interests of the child. . . . If they acquire
health, knowledge, and a sound bodily constitution, and ample intellectual development under the judicious training and discipline of a competent and careful mother,
it is very likely to tell favorably upon their pecuniary interests.
Id. at 285-86.
10 85 N.J. at 8, 424 A.2d at 213. This was the court's interpretation of prior case law;
however, the language in Suarez v. Berg, 177 N.J. Super. 456, 285 A.2d 68 (App. Div. 1971)
may also support the contrary proposition. That opinion expressly stated that the child's damages
for lost parental guidance and counsel were to be considered "during the child's minority." Id. at
462, 285 A.2d at 71. Conversely, it can be argued that the opinion did not specifically limit the
time span. Id. In Tilley v. Hudson River R.R., 29 N.Y. 252, 287-88 (1864), however, the court
explicitly held that damages for lost instruction and training could continue into the child's
majority. Id. at 287-88.
4185 N.J. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215.
42The court's holding is expressed in terms of the parent-child relationship, but there is no
reason to believe the holding is limited to only this association.
4385 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
The court observed that other jurisdictions have also moved away from a strict approach to
the pecuniary damages rule. Id. at 9-10, 424 A.2d at 214. In this regard, it praised the decisions
in Wycko v. Cnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn.
347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973);
and, Lockhardt v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
The Wycko case is particularly noteworthy for its holding that the pecuniary value of a
child's life should be measured by his or her unique importance as a functioning part of the
family unit, and that expenses previously incurred in raising the child should be considered in
determining damages. 361 Mich. at 338-42, 105 N.W.2d at 122-24. Wycko was overruled by
Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970), but the Michigan
legislature reacted by amending the wrongful death statute to include compensation for lost
companionship and society. 85 N.J. at 9-10, 424 A.2d at 214.
44 85 N.J. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215.
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children.4 5 As in parent-death cases, the estimate of damages is based
on uncertainties; however, this is not grounds for their denial. 4 The

court stated that the parent-child relationship is sufficient proof that
companionship and advice would have been rendered by the deceased.47 The damage to be assessed is not the emotional pleasure a
parent receives from the fact that it is his or her own child providing
the service. 48 Rather, it is the value of advice and counsel that can

regularly be purchased, and that value is "confined to what the
marketplace would pay a stranger with similar qualifications" to
4

provide it.
In Green the supreme court confronted the difficulty presented
by a wrongful death statute that measures the loss according to its

economic impact. A rigid adherence to the pecuniary standard, in
essence, renders the act void for the deaths of children. 50 Under this
circumstance, to sustain a parental recovery, value has to be placed on
some factor other than simple financial contributions. Thus, although

bound by the pecuniary loss standard, the court announced that
companionship has a pecuniary element which can properly be compensated. 51

45 id. at 11, 424 A.2d at 215. Chief Justice Wilentz noted that as parents grow older their
children's advice and companionship "may be most needed and valuable." Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at
211.
IId. at 15-17, 424 A.2d at 217.
Id. Discussing the high degree of jury speculation required to award damages in a
wrongful death case, the court suggested that experts could assist by providing relevant evidence.
Id. at 17, 424 A.2d at 218. However, proofs of this nature are not "legally necessary," only
"desirable." Id.
4 Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 216. The court noted that this aspect of the service will frequently be
the most beneficial. Id.
19Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215 (footnote omitted). The court explicitly defined the companionship allowed to be assessed:
[I]t is the loss of that kind of guidance, advice and counsel which all of us need
from time to time in particular situations, for specific purposes, perhaps as an aid in
making a business decision, or a decision affecting our lives generally, or even advice
and guidance needed to relieve us from unremitting depression. It must be the kind
of advice, guidance or counsel that could be purchased from a business adviser, a
therapist, or a trained counselor, for instance.
Id. at 14, 424 A.2d at 216-17.
'o

See notes 10 & 37 supra.

"

See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. Such an expanded interpretation of what

constitutes pecuniary loss has been commented on: "[A]llowance of non-pecuniary recovery by

means of unwarranted extensions of the pecuniary category is not to be recommended, but the
very existence of such devices indicate that the need to afford compensation for non-pecuniary
loss is b.ginning to be felt." H. McGPcoa, McGnRxoR

oN DAMACES

also the discussion at 85 N.J. at 13 n.4, 424 A.2d at 216 n.4.

1196 (13th ed. 1972). See
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The decision rectifies an unpleasant consequence potentially
wrought by the statute.5 2 Nonetheless, it was repeatedly stressed that
the holding was within the parameters of the statute. 53 Recovery for
the emotional injury suffered by parents remains precluded, even
though it is "unquestionably the most substantial element of damages
in these cases." 5 4 The court did explain that it was aware of "no
public policy which would prohibit awarding damages . . .for the

emotional suffering caused by the death," but it was not prepared to
further challenge the statute.5 5 Despite the reluctance to consider
emotional damages in Green, five months earlier the supreme court
examined, in a somewhat different context, a parent's claim for the
emotional response to her child's death. 5
PORTEE V. JAFFEE
In Portee v. affee, the court held that a mother who witnessed
the negligently inflicted suffering and death of her own child had an
individual cause of action for the emotional anguish resulting from the
perception of the event. 57 Justice Pashman, authoring the opinion of
a unanimous court, rejected a zone of danger58 approach to emotional
distress actions because it arbitrarily limits the imposition of tort
liability to those situations in which the claimant has been exposed to
a risk of harm.5 9 Instead, factors were articulated to determine
liability based upon traditional negligence concepts.60
The factual circumstances of Portee are particularly gruesome.
Renee Portee's seven-year-old son had become trapped between the
elevator cab and shaft of their apartment building. When the machine was activated the boy was pulled to the third floor. 6 ' Soon
thereafter, police arrived and for four and one-half hours they worked

51The court's displeasure with the result may be gleaned from its glowing descriptions of the
deceased. She was "what everybody would want a daughter to be ....She was a good-hearted,
devoted and dependable daughter." 85 N.J. at 4-5, 424 A.2d at 211-12.
s3id. at 5, 11-13, 17-18, 424 A.2d at 211, 215-16, 218.
-" Id. at 5, 424 A.2d at 211.
5sId. at 13, 424 A.2d at 216.
-6See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
'id.

"Zone of danger" is a label used by many courts to describe the extent to which they will
impose liability for the infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Ilosp..
197 N.W. 2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
'9 84 N.J. at 99, 417 A.2d at 527.
6oSee notes 76-85 inJra and accompanying text.
6184 N.J. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522.

1981]

COMMENT

to extricate the child.62 As they made their efforts, the mother helplessly watched, unable to effectuate her son's release.A3 Although he
had earlier been moaning and flailing his arms, by the time he was
finally freed the child was dead.64
Alleging that the elevator was negligently designed and maintained, Mrs. Portee filed suit against the owners of the building as
well as the manufacturer of the elevator and the company responsible
for its maintenance and installation. 5 The complaint presented three
causes of action: a wrongful death claim, a survival claim, and an
individual claim for the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff as
a consequence of witnessing her son's death.66 Thereafter, a motion
was made for summary judgment as to the claim for emotional disturbance, and relying on Falzone v. Busch, 7 the trial court dismissed
that portion of the complaint because the injury was not occasioned
by the mother's fear for her own personal safety. 68 After leave to
appeal was granted by the appellate division, the case was directly
certified by the supreme court.69
Prior to 1965, New Jersey prohibited recovery of damages for the
infliction of emotional distress in the absence of accompanying physical impact.70 That year, in the Falzone decision, the supreme court
discarded the impact requirement and held "that where negligence
causes fright from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury,""

02

Id.

83

Id. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522-23.

In oral argument before the trial court, defense counsel contended Mrs. Portee was not
present at the scene; however, the case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, so Mrs.
Portee's presence was accepted as true. Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Portee

v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
14 84 N.J. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522-23.
61 Id. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523.
aa id.
67 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).

" 84 N.J. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523.
69 See Portee v. Jaffee, 82 N.J. 295, 412 A.2d 801 (1980).
70 84 N.J. at 93, 417 A.2d at 523. This has been settled law since the plaintiff's complaint in
Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900) was found insufficient
because it alleged emotional injuries resulting from the mere apprehension of physical injuries.
See, e.g., Greenburg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958), modified on
other grounds, 30 N.J. 458, 153 A.2d 673 (1959). The decision in Ward was justified by three
reasons: (1) ordinarily, a person's physical injury is not a probable consequence of fear; (2) the
consensus of the state bar was against imposing liability; and (3) public policy dictated against
allowing conjectural claims and exposing the courts to speculative litigation. 65 N.J.L. at
385-86, 47 A. at 561-62. However, the "impact rule" was often easily circumvented. See, e.g.,
Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (impact of dust
sufficient to impose liability); see 84 N.J. at 92-94, 417 A.2d at 523-24.
" 45 N.J. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17.
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damages may be recovered if the induced emotional injury is substantial. 72 Subsequent decisions narrowly interpreted Falzone to deny
73
liability unless the plantiff had experienced a risk of physical danger,
but the supreme court in Portee v. Jaffee indicated that such a limitation on liability was never demanded.7 4 Instead, general concepts of
75
duty and proximate cause govern.

For guidance, Justice Pashman returned to an emotional distress
case decided in the year following Falzone. In Caputzal v. The Lind-

say Co., 76 the supreme court approved a standard to gauge liability

and this measure was repeated in Portee: "liability should depend on
the defendant's foreseeing fright or shock severe enough to cause
substantial injury in a person normally constituted, thus then bringing
77 Under this
the plaintiff within the 'zone of risk.' ,,
formula the zone

of physical danger does not have to coincide with the zone of emotional danger, so the holding vital to the plaintiff in Falzone does not
necessarily limit other litigants. 78 Additionally, the court noted that
in Berman v. Allan, 7 it had recently recognized a claim for emotional
damages absent any fear for personal safety and that Berman could
support the imposition of liability in Portee.80

72

Id.

Falzoneexplicitly overruled Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561

(1900). In turn, the Falzone court found that the first rationale offered in Ward was more
properly a question of medical evidence; that the second reason was artificial; and that the
public policy concern based on difficulties of proof should not act to bar potential litigants. 45
N.J. at 563-66, 214 A.2d at 14-16. Because the trial court in Portee found Falzone dispositive, the
latter holding was analyzed by the supreme court in Portee. See 84 N.J. at 93, 417 A.2d at 524.
73 See, e.g., Burd v. Vercruyssen, 142 N.J. Super. 344, 361 A.2d 571 (App. Div. 1976). But
see Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super 79, 379 A.2d 57
(App. Div. 1977).
7184 N.J. at 94-95, 417 A.2d at 524.
75 Id.

76 48 N.J. 69, 222 A.2d 513 (1966).
77 84 N.J. at 94, 417 A.2d at 524 (quoting Caputzal,48 N.J. at 76, 22 A.2d at 517 (quoting 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF Tonrs § 18.4, at 1036 (1956))).
78 84 N.J. at 95, 417 A.2d at 524-25.
Interestingly, Falzone permitted a plaintiff to pursue a claim, but Caputzal utilized the
foreseeability rule to deny a claim and restrict a lower court which "read Falzone too broadly."
Caputzal,48 N.J. at 73, 222 A.2d at 515. Portee used the same foreseeability rule to recognize a
claim and overturn a lower court which interpreted Falzone too narrowly. As the Caputzal
decision noted, the concept of foreseeability frequently depends on questions of public policy. Id.
at 75, 222 A.2d at 516.
79 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
80 84 N.J. at 95, 417 A.2d at 525. Berman authorized parental recovery for emotional
damages resulting from a "wrongful birth." Liability was recognized for the failure of the
defendant doctors to inform the prospective parents of a prenatal test which most probably
would have revealed the presence of Down's Syndrome in the fetus at a time when the parents
still had an option to abort. The court found the deprivation of this option coupled with the
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Applying the traditional negligence principles set down in

Caputzal, the court determined that the defendants owed the plaintiff
a duty of reasonable care. 8 ' Although concerned with the problem of
imposing liability which exceeds the culpability of negligent conduct,
the court held that the "fundamental interest in emotional tranquility
founded on parental love"82 is of such significance that "[t]he law
should find more than pity for one who is stricken by seeing that a

loved one has been critically injured or killed."18 3 Justice Pashman
observed that other courts which have declared liability under similar
circumstances 84 have all confined the relief to be commensurate with

emotional suffering caused by the subsequent birth of a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome to
be a tortious injury which could be recompensed in monetary damages. 80 N.J. at 433-44, 404
A.2d at 15.
The issue in Berman can be distinguished from that in Portee by the nature of the duty
involved. In Berman the defendants owed a duty directly to the parents, thereby obviating a
judicial search for the source of a legal relationship. In Portee there was no legally recognized
relation between the parent and the negligent defendants. Hence, the court in Porteescrutinized
the relation between the parties. Justice Pashman, who wrote each decision, distinguished the
two cases solely "in terms of the degree of foreseeability." 84 N.J. at 95, 417 A.2d at 525.
Another reason for the dissimilar treatment of the liability in the two cases may be based on
a policy concern. In Berman the parents were the only potential plaintiffs; however, in Portee
the court was faced with a situation wherein a limitless class of plaintiffs could result through the
imposition of liability.
"1 84 N.J. at 96, 417 A.2d at 525. The court stated that the issue before it could be addressed
as whether it was foreseeable the plaintiff would witness her son's death; however, this formulation was ultimately a question of duty. Id. at 95, 417 A.2d at 525. It was also observed that the
Falzone standard could arguably be applied to attach liability because the plaintiff herself had
been within the zone of risk created by the defective elevator. Id. Describing this as an "artful
yet artificial approach," the court abandoned such an analysis. Id. at 96, 417 A.2d at 525.
82 Id. at 98, 417 A.2d at 526.
83 Id. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526. As the text indicates, the duty arises by reason of the
importance of the interest worthy of protection. Id. at 97, 101, 417 A.2d at 526, 528. Repeating
the words of Chief Justice Weintraub, the court stated: " 'Whether a duty exists is ultimately a
question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature
of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.' " 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528
(quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)
(emphasis in original)).
8,E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (seminal case
in area). Dillon elucidates the unjust results capable of being produced by the "zone of danger"
limitation on liability for emotional distress. Mrs. Dillon witnessed the defendant's automobile
strike and kill her daughter Erin. Another daughter, Cheryl, also saw the accident but happened
to be closer to the event than her mother. Both the mother and the surviving daughter brought
claims for emotional suffering. The trial court dismissed the mother's claim, but denied a motion
for summary judgment on the child's claim because she, unlike the mother, may have reasonably
been in fear of her own safety. Rejecting the "zone of danger" doctrine, the California Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal and implemented guidelines to determine liability based on the
foreseeability of the risk involved in a particular case. Id.
In reaching its decision in Portee, the court reviewed the standards enunciated in Dillon and
found they "create a strong case for negligence liability." 84 N.J. at 98, 417 A.2d at 526.
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the defendant's culpability. 85 To avoid the imposition of punitive
liability, recovery in Portee was restricted to those instances in which
there is: serious injury or death of another effected by the defendant's
negligence; 8 6 an intimate or familial relation between the injured

person and the plaintiff; 8 7 observation by the plaintiff of the injury at
the scene;

8

and, resultant severe emotional suffering.8 9

The decision in Portee v. Jaffee is a major advance in the protection of a personal interest that has historically received relatively little

defense. 90 Although the holding has a great import on emotional

interests arising in contexts other than the parent-child relation, it is

additionally significant in this particular circumstance because no
remedy exists to adequately compensate parents for the loss of a child.
Based on the decision, however, parents are entitled to be compensated only for the emotional injury sustained by witnessing the trauma
to their child."' They are not entitled to compensation for the grief
caused by the loss of the child.9 2
85 84 N.J. at 97-98, 417 A.2d at 526. The court was very concerned about extending an
unreasonable degree of liability. Justice Cardozo's classic equation was repeated: " 'The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.' " Id. at 99, 417 A.2d at 527 (quoting
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 229 N.Y.S. (1928)). Justice
Cardozo's formula expresses the traditional principle of tort law that liability should not impose
beyond the proportion of the defendant's fault. See W. PaossEm, supra note 2, § 53, at 325,
wherein "duty" is described as "only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."
While the court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
principally measured the scope of the duty owed in terms of the ability of the defendant to
foresee the injury, id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, the court in Portee articulated
its analysis directly in terms of the concern to protect a fundamental personal interest. 84 N.J. at
101, 417 A.2d at 528. In each case though, the decision was reached through the application of
traditional rules of tort.
8084 N.J. at 100-01, 417 A.2d at 527-28. This factor was not required in Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (198), but the Dillon court did not attempt to
"predetermine the defendant's obligation in every situation." Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920,
69 Cal.
Rptr. at 80. Its guidelines were merely an aid to resolve liability in future cases. Id. On the other
hand, the court in Portee announced elements essential to a cause of action. 84 N.J. at 101, 417
A.2d at 528.
87 84 N.J. at 98-99, 417 A.2d at 526-27.
" Id. at 99-100, 417 A.2d at 527.
89 Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528.
Considering the operation of the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1
(West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), the court also held that recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress should be diminished by the percentage of the contributing negligence of both
the injured person and the plaintiff. 84 N.J. at 101-02, 417 A.2d at 528.
90 But see notes 114-23 infra and accompanying text.
91 Applying the Portee criteria, a New Jersey trial court has held that the plaintiff does not
have to witness the injury-producing event; it is sufficient to witness the injury. Mercado v.
Transport of New Jersey, 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (Law Div. 1980).
11 Albeit a fine distinction, it is one upon which the holding in Portee is based. It is the
"trauma accompanying the observation of the death" that is compensable. 84 N.J. at 100, 417
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The restriction represents a concern about imposing immoderate
burdens on negligent conduct. The court did not want to unnecessar-

ily open the door of liability to many persons with whom the wrongdoer had not come in contact.9 3 Therefore, while extending liability
beyond the immediate accident victim, the court established a new
limitation grounded on the unsupported assumption that "only a witness at the scene of an accident causing death or serious injury will
suffer a traumatic sense of loss that may destroy his sense of security
and cause severe emotional distress. '9 4 By confining the cause of
action in this manner, the court addressed the situation it was faced
with, but regrettably instituted yet another artificial distinction. 5 It
is difficult to substantiate the mandate that potential plaintiffs be
present at the scene of an injury." No research indicates that the
resultant emotional distress is quantifiably different in this instance.
In fact, experience tells us that regardless of the manner through
which we learn of a loved one's death, the core of the injury remains

the sudden realization that the person's life has needlessly been extin97
guished.
CONFORMING THE STATUTE TO
MODERN DAMAGE CONCEPTS

The failure of the wrongful death statute to yield compensation
under compelling circumstances involving child deaths was evident in

A.2d at 527. The assessment of damages would logically entail discerning and compensating only
the distress provoked by witnessing the death, to the exclusion of the basic emotional losses
resulting from the death. Shearing the psychic injury in this manner, however, is difficult at
best. It is more reasonable to allow the plaintiff, having met the requirement of witnessing the
event, to collect damages for all ensuing emotional distress. The distinction is not discussed in the
Portee decision. The problem arises when Portee'sjudicially created cause of action is read in
conjunction with the statutory prohibition on awarding damages for the emotional injuries
caused by death.
,' See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
o,84 N.J. at 99, 417 A.2d at 527.
' The practical considerations behind the court's guidelines, as well as a suggested solution
very similar to the court's disposition, were discussed by Dean Prosser. W. Pnoss n, supra note 2,
§ 54, at 334-35. He labeled the distinction as "quite arbitary." Id. at 335.
98 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 748, 441 P.2d 912, 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 86 (1968)
(Burke, J., dissenting).
9' As the decision in Mercado v. Transport of New Jersey, 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800
(Law Div. 1980) indicates, the Portee criteria are subject to interpretation and extension by
lower courts. See note 91 supra. This will be especially true with questions concerning how near
the accident scene the plaintiff must be, and how soon afterwards the plaintiff must view the
injury. An additional query concerns what constitutes a serious injury.
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both the Green and Portee decisions. In Green, when the jury conscientiously applied the law to the facts, the plaintiff discovered there
were no legal damages. To avoid a similar downfall, the plaintiff in
Portee resorted to a personal injury claim.98 The decisions in each
case have in different ways enlarged the scope of damages recoverable
for the death of a minor. Green has expanded the compensation
standard, while Portee has extended the reach of tort liability. Ostensibly not a wrongful death case, Portee succeeds where the statute
fails.9 9 It dispenses a remedy for an emotional injury stemming from
the death of a loved one.100 Because of Green's admonition that a
verdict of no damages should normally be set aside,' 0 ' it is no longer
legally true that in the case of a child-plaintiff it is "more profitable
for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him.

' 102

Never-

theless, damages for the emotional wounds resulting from wrongful
death are still statutorily prohibited. 03
The Green and Portee decisions conform to a legislative command, first issued over one hundred and thirty years ago, that death
be measured by its economic consequences. 0 4 Each holding, in sympathy with social mores, has adjusted the undesirable effect of the

08 If the wrongful death statute had provided a remedy for emotional injuries, Mrs. Portee
could have enforced her claim under the statute. The degree of emotional distress may be greater
on account of witnessing the event, but it would still be compensable because it is a consequence
of the death.
It can be argued that the emotional distress resulting from the first-hand observation of a
deadly injury is a harm distinct from the emotional distress occasioned by the mere realization of
a deadly injury, and that therefore the former suffering would not be compensable even under a
wrongful death statute that allows damages for emotional losses. It is contended here, however,
that severing the psychic injury is not truly possible. The emotional disturbance in each case is
induced by the realization of death. The difference is solely one of degree. See note 92 supra.
Because Portee requires death or serious injury, the decision has relevance beyond death
cases.
10'See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
10185 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
102 W. PRossEa, supra note 2, § 127, at 902 (footnote omitted).

See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
the landmark case of Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960),
Justice Smith, writing for the majority eloquently observed that the pecuniary standard for
measuring life is the product of another era.
In most areas the development of the law has parallelled the enlightened conscience
of our people ... [yjet there still exists in the law this remote and repulsive
backwash of time and civilization, untouched by the onward march of society,
where precedents we alone honor tell us that the value of the life of a child must be
measured solely by the standards of the day when he peddled the skill of his hands
and the strength of his back at the factory gates.
Id. at 337-38, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
103

104 In
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73

pecuniary rule'0 5 and recognized that a lost life leaves damages besides
those which are "bankable cash assets."1 8 It is now the responsibility
of the legislature to eliminate this unjust rule completely. The New
Jersey wrongful death statute should be amended by adding mental
anguish as a component of the damages to be compensated in a
wrongful death action.10 7 This would allow the calculation of damages for proper reasons, 0 8 after consideration of what experience
reveals as the actual injuries suffered when a loved one, especially a
child, is taken by death. 1D When the loss of life is no longer equated
with the amount of financial assistance that may have been rendered, 1' 0 damage awards for what are truly emotional injuries will no
longer have to be fictionally justified on the basis of a pecuniary
label."'

"0" Portee, under the auspices of a personal injury action, circumvents the pecuniary standard
when the plaintiff witnesses another's injury at the scene. 84 N.J. at 99-100, 417 A.2d at 527. See
notes 92 & 98 supra and accompanying text.
106Hare, s-upra note 12, at 340.
107 This may be achieved by merely inserting the words "and emotional" into the statute so
that it would read: "In every action brought under the provisions of this chapter the jury may
give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary [and
emotional] injuries resulting from such death to the persons entitled to any intestate personal
property of the decedent." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
The author uses the term "emotional injuries" to connote the broad range of losses that may
include companionship, society, consortium, guidance, assistance, counsel, protection, and
comfort.
The suggested solution would not resolve all recognized problems arising from the present
wrongful death statute. In the recent case of Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981),
the supreme court interpreted the statute to hold that a wrongful death action is not necessarily
precluded by a judgment in a personal injury suit instituted by the decedent prior to death. This
holding compelled Justice Clifford to remark that the problems posed by the case "are simply too
complex to be resolved by placing bandaids over the gaps in the law." Id. at 131, 432 A.2d at 874
(Clifford, J., dissenting). See also note 125 infra.
los The revision would wholly achieve the Green court's objective to "reduce the pressure on
juries to award damages for" the wrong reason. 85 N.J. at 5, 424 A.2d at 211.
'0 See Speiser & Malawer, supra note 4, at 19.
In the authoritative work on the subject, Stuart Speiser comments:
It is obvious that in most death cases, the emotional impact of the loss of a beloved
person is at least equal to, if not greater than, the 'pecuniary' loss involved. The
notion of pecuniary loss has gradually been eroded anyway, so that it now stands as
an impious fiction which rubs salt into the wounds of the bereaved family, and
serves as an obstacle to the evenhanded administration of justice in wrongful death

cases.

S. SPErns,
supra note 2, § 3:5, at 344.
"I'Other jurisdictions that have adopted remedial schemes which compensate the emotional
injuries attendant a wrongful death are: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico. 85 N.J. at 13 n.4, 424 A.2d at
216 n.4. See S. SpeasEa, supra note 2, § 353.
"I F. HAnPEn & F. JAMES, .supra note 77, § 25.14, at 1331.

74
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The statutory inadequacy is less apparent in an adult's death,"

2

but the statute is not more practicable as a result. In this instance the

pecuniary injuries may overshadow the emotional injuries; however,
this is not reason to deny all compensation for the latter. 1 3 The
emotional injury constituting the loss of consortium" 4 is routinely
recognized in the personal injury actions of this state." 5 Thus, it is
only when the loss of consortium is most complete that there will be
no recovery for it."0 If the negligent conduct stops short of death a
7
recovery will be permitted."
The prohibition against compensating the emotional disturbance
in death cases becomes more incongruous upon considering various
other situations under which the damage has been honored by the

courts of this jurisdiction." 8 Although not compensated when one is
deprived of the parental relationship through wrongful death, emotional injuries are redressed when one is deprived "of the option to

accept or reject a parental relationship.""19 Similarly, plaintiffs are
entitled to recover for the emotional distress over the possible death of
an unborn child, 2 0 and for anxiety over the uncertainty of their
112

Presumably, most actions involving an adult's wrongful death produce a more than

nominal recovery reasonably based on the amount of lost earnings or services. Thus, there are
few New Jersey supreme court decisions concerning damages in this type case. Those that have
considered the topic have reckoned with peripheral issues. See. e.g.. Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J.
255, 245 A.2d 177 (1968) (surviving spouse's subsequent remarriage not evidence to mitigate
damages); Jurman v. Samuel Braen, Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 222 A.2d 78 (1966) (jury instruction
regarding deceased's contributory negligence not error requiring reversal: damages to be apportioned among survivors).
"x It seems elementary that the underlying principle of tort law is to place the injured party in
the same position in which he or she was prior to the wrongful act. "Ordinary damages are a
sum awarded as a fair measure of compensation to the plaintiff, the amount being, as near as
can be estimated, that by which he is worse for the defendant's wrongdoing." F. POLLACK, supra
note 2, at 184.
"4 "Consortium," as it is used in pleadings, is said to have the same meaning as "the
companionship or society of a wife." BricK's LAw DicrsoNARY 280 (5th ed. 1979). The claim is
not pecuniary in nature. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 9, at 333.
", See, e.g., Schuttler v. Reinhardt, 17 N.J. Super. 480, 86 A.2d 438 (App. Div. 1952).
16 See Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 44 A. 633 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899). But cf.
Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980) (pecuniary element of companionship compensable).
"' Theoretically, if a spouse is seriously injured but lives for a period of time before expiring.
the surviving spouse has a cognizable claim for lost consortium while the mate was alive, though
not for the period after death.
118According to Dean Prosser, the only valid objection to awarding damages for mental
anguish is the danger of fictitious claims; in cases where there is a special likelihood of emotional
injury, recovery has been allowed. W. PnossEa, supra note 2, § 54.
19 See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
'2 See Carter v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 47 N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (App.
Div. 1957).
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child's normality. 12' Our courts have also demonstrated a willingness
to impose liability for emotional injuries caused by the negligent
handling of a child's corpse' 2 2 and, most discordantly, for the aggra2 3
vation caused by the processing of consumer complaints.
The limitation to pecuniary injuries for wrongful death offends

contemporary mores. Legally, socially, and psychologically the losses
arising from negligent conduct are incompletely distributed. The addition of emotional injuries as a component of damages12 4 would rear
the wrongful death statute into the twentieth century by reflecting the
conscience of the society it serves and by abolishing the illogical
dichotomy that exists between judicially created emotional interests
and the statutorily created interest in wrongful death. There is pres-

ently in the New Jersey Senate a bill seeking to make wholesale
amendments to the wrongful death statute.125 Of particular significance is new language which would provide emotional damages to
certain survivors whose relationship to the deceased is specified in the
bill. 12 Awarding damages for the emotional injury under clearly

defined circumstances 27 would resolve the dilemmas confronted in
the Green and Portee cases. Inefficacious verdicts would be eliminated without opening the door of unlimited liability.

Paul A. Lisovicz
12, See Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical & Gynecological Prof. Assoc., 166 N.J. Super. 579, 400
A.2d 147 (Law Div. 1979).
122See Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 379
A.2d 57 (App. Div. 1977).
"I See Lemaldi v. DeTomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Law
Div. 1978); Fiore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 144 N.J. Super. 74, 634 A.2d 572 (Law Div. 1976).
For a detailed discussion regarding the inconsistent treatment afforded wrongful death claims as
compared to personal injury claims, see Speiser & Malawer, supra note 4.
"1I In personal injury actions, the concommitant mental pain and suffering is always a
component of the damages to be assessed. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143
A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958). In fact, in cases of disfiguring cosmetic injuries, the mental injuries,
embarrassment, and humiliation, may be the most significant.
I'sS. No. 1043, 199th. N.J. Legis., 1st Sess. (1981).
12"The pertinent section of the proposed bill reads:
Loss of the special relationship between and among spouses, parents, children and
siblings shall form a basis for the award of damages recoverable hereunder. Loss of
such relationship may include consideration of mental anguish and emotional pain
and suffering only in the case of a surviving spouse, child, father, or mother, or
persons standing in loco parentis to the deceased person or to whom the deceased
stood in loco parentis at the time of the injury which caused the death of the
deceased or in the alternative surviving brothers and sisters.
Id.
127 The proposed bill would also allow surviving parents of "unemancipated minor children"
to be compensated for the expenses incurred in raising the child prior to death. Id. This is not an
emotional injury. It would represent an extension of the pecuniary category of damages, and is
not advocated by this comment.

